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Abstract.  Analysis of the firm’s boundaries in terms of: perspectives – legal/proprietary; 
responsibility; control - ; stakeholders – shareholders and managers but also others and 
specifically labour and  governments -; dimensions – organization of production; 
geographical/by nation-state; sectoral -. The organization of production in hierarchical as well 
as in a variety of hybrid forms and to the position of labour in the context of these hybrid 
forms. The geographical – by nation-states - dimension leads to a discussion of transnational 
companies, the advantages they derive from operating across borders and the source of such 
advantages. Detailed analysis of the position of two stakeholders vis-à-vis the changing 
boundaries of the firm: labour and governments. How organizational and geographical 
fragmentation of production lead to a more fragmented and weaker labour force.  The 
geographical dimension and the position of governments in relation to transnational 
companies.  How the changing boundaries of the firm particularly with respect to 
organizational forms and to the geography of direct foreign operations by TNCs put both 
labour and governments in a weaker position.  
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1. Introduction 
The firm has been the subject of study by economists, sociologists, management scientists, 
finance and accountancy experts for a long time. A variety of issues are dealt with in the 
literature. Their richness makes it difficult to arrive at neat classifications and discipline 
boundaries. A recent volume by Dietrich and Krafft (2012) bundles the issues between 
‘Economics of the firm’ and ‘Theory of the Firm’. The former is supposed to be concerned 
with issues related to organizational boundaries and the internal structure of the firm. The 
latter is more concerned with issues of firms’ strategies in the context of the market. That the 
two aspects interact is recognized by the authors in their introductory chapter and their book, 
indeed, aims to build bridges and highlight interactions between the ‘Economics’ and the 
‘Theory’ of the firm. 
The present author considers the interaction to be so strong as to make it impossible to 
distinguish between so called ‘Economics’ and so called ‘Theory’ of the firm. Of course 
researchers may concentrate on a specific issue but, in the real world, a change, say, in the 
organizational structure of a large firm may impact – and be affected by – its strategic 
behaviour towards other stakeholders or by changes in the market. Though the issue of 
boundaries affects both large and smaller firms, we shall concentrate on large and 
transnational corporations. Smaller firms will come into the discourse mainly in terms of their 
contractual relationships with the larger corporation. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses a variety of perspectives, 
stakeholders and dimensions of boundaries. This is followed, in Section three, by an analysis 
of boundaries in terms of the organization of production. Section four considers cross-
countries boundaries and the transnational corporation (TNC). Section five analyses how the 
existence of nation-states can create advantages for TNCs. Sections six and seven approach 
and analyse boundaries from the point of view of labour as stakeholder. Section eight 
discusses the issue of boundaries in relation to governments as stakeholders. The last section 
summarises and concludes with some discussion about possible work ahead. 
1. Boundaries: perspectives, stakeholders and dimensions  
A variety of perspectives 
Where does the firm begin and where does it end? Is a small contractor working exclusively 
for a large department store part of the same retailing firm or a separate firm and if so why? 
Is a Japanese subcontractor working in the 1980s exclusively for a car manufacturer part of 
the latter corporation or not? If not, why not?  Are the boundaries of the firm a legal matter as 
in the property rights approach? Or are they an organizational matter: hierarchies versus 
markets and their respective efficiency? Or are they connected with control? But what is the 
meaning of control and why does it matter? Are there several dimensions to boundaries?  
If we want to understand the relevance of boundaries and their impact on various 
stakeholders to the firm, we must attempt to answer these questions. To facilitate our task, we 
shall begin with an analysis of perspectives, dimensions and stakeholders of boundaries as 
summarized in Table 1. The table consists of three vertical sections to be read separately (1a; 
1b; and 1c).  
We can consider boundaries from a variety of perspectives and specifically the following. We 
can take the legal/proprietary perspective and this is mostly what is done in the literature: the 
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activity is part of the firm if the resources invested in it and the outcome/product belongs to 
the firm. From this perspective when part of the production process is outsourced the process 
itself and its inputs do not belong to the firm and do not form part of it; therefore the principal 
firm has no responsibility for them. However, the product belongs, contractually to the 
principal; it therefore becomes part of the firm and can be sold to clients or used for further 
processing. Both the transaction cost and the property rights approaches to the firm can be 
subsumed under the legal/proprietary perspective.  
A second perspective relates to control.  Control has several connotations. We can look at 
control from the perspective of the equity ownership necessary to exercise control at Board 
level. What percentage of shares is necessary to secure control of the firm vis-a’-vis other 
shareholders? Working in the context of international firm, Hymer (1960) analysed this 
question and came out with the breakthrough distinction between portfolio investment and 
direct foreign investment.  
A second connotation of control relates to the relationship between shareholders and 
managers. Following Berle and Means (1932) seminal work a large amount of literature has 
focused on the control exercised by managers who are the real decision makers within the 
modern corporation. Their interests do not always coincide with those of the shareholders2. 
Moreover, the interest of divisional managers may clash with those of headquarters’ 
managers.  
Table 1. Boundaries of the firm: perspectives (1a); stakeholders (1b); dimensions (1c). 
Perspectives (1a)  Stakeholders (1b)  Dimensions (1c) 
Legal/proprietary 
 
Control: 
Within the firm:  
• Equity  
• Managerial 
Outside the proprietary 
boundaries 
 
Responsibility for: 
• Labour force 
• Brand reputation 
• Risk taking 
 
 Shareholders, managers 
 
Labour 
 
Governments; tax payers: 
• of regions  
• of nation-states 
 
Suppliers and distributors 
 
Consumers 
 
Rival firms 
 Organisation of production:  
• hierarchical  
• externalization  
• hybrid forms 
 
Geographical: 
• uninational 
• transnational 
 
Sectoral field: 
• Single sector 
• Diversified 
 
Growth strategies and 
processes: 
• Organic growth 
• Mergers and 
acquisitions 
 
Origin of profits and value: 
• Main activities 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  There	  is	  a	  huge	  literature	  on	  this	  issue.	  See	  Baumol	  (1959),	  Marris	  (1967);	  Bengt	  and	  Holmstrom	  (1998),	  
Bolton	  and	  Scharfestein	  (1998)	  and,	  more	  recently,	  Bo	  and	  Driver	  (2012).	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• Speculative 
investment 
 
 
Hymer (1971) looked at it from a different angle than the dichotomy managers v 
shareholders. He considers the necessary technical and organizational structures for the 
effective exercise of control by managers. In particular, he highlights how, in the modern 
multidivisional, geographically-spread corporation, the exercise of control over far away 
subsidiaries may be impossible if the system of communications and the organization of the 
business across countries are not suitable. This was indeed the case of much foreign business 
prior to the First World War (WWI). There were then a large number of enterprises whose 
assets were owned wholly or in large part by a person or groups or companies in foreign 
countries (often in Britain or The Netherlands). However, though these owners from foreign 
countries had controlling stakes in the business, they were not in a position to exercise 
managerial control because of the large distance between the home and host countries under 
conditions of poor communication and transportation systems3.  
The following decades saw the development of two relevant and interconnected innovations 
both of which form the sufficient conditions for the exercise of managerial control. First, the 
technological innovation in personal communications which started with the telegraph and 
telephone and, more recently, with electronic communications. Second, organizational 
innovations4 which were made possible (and/or strongly facilitated) by the communication 
technologies. 
A final connotation of control relates to control that the large firm can exercise outside its 
proprietary boundaries on other firms usually smaller ones such as sub-contractors, 
franchisers and general suppliers or distributors. If the principal firm controls the design, 
brand, quantity and quality of the process and its output then – strategically – the activity of 
the subcontractor can be seen as part of the principal firm: they are part of the overall strategy 
of the larger company and these strategies shape their own business fortunes and moves. In 
this vein, Cowling and Sugden (1987:12) define the firm within the perspective of strategic 
control: ‘A firm is the means of coordinating production from one center of strategic 
decision-making.’ They then go on to extend their definition to the TNC: ‘ A transnational is 
the means of coordinating production from one center of strategic decision-making when this 
coordination takes a firm across national boundaries.’ 
A final perspective on the firm’s boundaries relates to spheres of responsibility and risk 
taking. This is another side of the strategic control coin, in the relationship between the large 
principal firm and its network of suppliers. The outsourcing of some or most of the 
production process usually involves passing on responsibility for the workforce used in that 
part of the process to the subcontractors. In many cases the latter provide also the equipment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Mira Wilkins (1988) calls these businesses ‘free-standing enterprises’ to highlight the fact that though they 
were owned wholly or partially by foreign nationals (whether individuals or groups or companies), they were 
managed and developed as independent concerns.  	  
4	  Developments	  in	  internal	  organization	  of	  companies	  have	  been	  analysed	  under	  several	  theoretical	  
approaches.	  From	  Penrose	  (1959)	  to	  Chandler	  (1962)	  to	  Williamson	  (1975;	  1981;	  1984)	  to	  Hymer	  (1970).	  
Westney	  and	  Zaheer	  (2001)	  consider	  grid	  structures.	  See	  also	  Ietto-­‐Gillies	  (2012:	  ch.	  1)	  for	  a	  discussion	  on	  this	  
issue.	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and assets necessary in the process. They bear the responsibility and risks for them. An 
extreme example is that of Uber, the Californian digital taxi company which – so far – appear 
sto own no taxis and to employ no taxi drivers. It supplies the technology. 
A variety of stakeholders 
The boundaries of the firm have, usually, been analysed from the point of view of 
shareholders and managers as the main stakeholders. This is in accordance with the 
legal/proprietary perspective on the firm. There is, of course, a huge literature on the 
shareholders versus managers’ perspective and interests and on possible divergence between 
these two groups of stakeholders as mentioned in the previous sub-section. I am not going to 
delve further into this issue as the interest of the present paper is more on those stakeholders 
that seem to have been rather forgotten by the literature. There are, in fact, several groups of 
people who are greatly affected by the boundaries of the firm over and above the 
shareholders and managers. They are: labour; governments of regions and nation-states; 
suppliers and distributors (Table 1b). 
As the companies’ strategies have become more complex, the impact on these rather 
forgotten shareholders has become more profound and yet more opaque. It is, for example, 
not easy to understand whether and how the loss of bargaining power by labour or 
governments vis-à-vis the corporate sector in the last three decades may be due to 
externalization of activities or to strategies of transnationality or to sectoral diversification or 
to the financialization of the firm (Gallino, 2005). 
Many of the problems derive from the fact that researchers analysing firm’s boundaries have 
tended to use theoretical frameworks with a specific point of view only: that of shareholders 
and managers. In the following sections I will emphasize how: (a) the strategies of firms are 
often directed at stakeholders other than the consumers and rival firms; and (b) any of these 
stakeholders can be greatly affected by the firm’s strategies even if the latter are not directly 
aimed at them.  
A variety of dimensions 
The issues discussed in this section are highlighted in Table 1c. Most literature dealing with 
boundaries takes the view that the boundaries of the firm are an important issue and has to do 
with the organization/coordination of production and wider business activities and, generally, 
with governance structures. Traditionally two main governance and coordination structures 
were seen as relevant: hierarchical coordination via the firm and coordination via the market. 
The former is also seen as a form of internal organization/coordination and the latter as a 
form of externalization. In this perspective, the various business activities and stages of the 
production process can all be organized internally to the firm and run via managerial and 
hierarchical structures; or some of them can be bought out and thus organized via the market. 
Casson and Wadeson (2012: 172) write on this: ‘Internalization is a theory of the boundaries 
of a firm. It does not claim to be a complete and self-sufficient theory of the firm, but rather a 
necessary component of any comprehensive theory of the firm.’ Whether the 
managerial/hierarchical or the market coordination prevails depends on specific costs and 
constraints of operating in the market versus operating internally to the firm. This is the basis 
of the internalization theory of the firm built up from the seminal work of Coase (1937). The 
further work, in a similar direction, by Williamson (1975; 1985) is seen by some authors as 
different enough to constitute a different theory and approach. 
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I acknowledge that internalization versus externalization/market coordination is an essential 
dimension of the debate on boundaries. For this reason it is further considered in details in the 
next section. Nonetheless, there are other dimensions in the discourse on boundaries.  
A second very important dimension relates to the geography of operations. Within a fully 
internalized structure – or within the context of those activities and processes that are 
internalized - the production process may be organized in single or multi-plant or multi 
branch structures. In the latter case the various plants or branches tend to be spread 
geographically. The geographical spread may span a single country or several. When more 
than one country is involved the firm becomes a transnational on which more in section four. 
It should, however, be noted that transnationality can occur also within the externalization 
form of coordination. For example, a TNC from country A can subcontract work or give 
franchises in countries B, C and D. 
Another dimension of boundaries pertains to the sectoral field: many firms operate their 
activities within a single sector such as mechanical engineering; others may be more 
diversified and span their activities within more than one sector. The diversification may 
grow organically – for example a firm producing dishwashers may branch out into the 
chemical sector by producing washing powder. Or the diversification may relate to 
completely unrelated sectors or to sectors connected by the potential capture of customers. 
The latter may be the case of supermarkets selling financial products. Whichever the 
motivations and strategies leading to diversification, the spreading of firm’s boundaries to 
sectors other than the original or primary one has implications for the long term life of the 
firm as well as for its various stakeholders.  
A further dimension relates to growth strategies: organic growth versus growth via mergers 
and acquisitions (M&As). These two very different growth strategies. They lead to changes 
in the boundaries of the firm that have wide implications for the destiny of the company and 
for its stakeholders, in particular for labour. 
Finally, we could look at dimensionality in terms of where the profits and values come from. 
Some firms derive all or most of their profits and value from investment in activities related 
to their sector(s) of operations. Others may derive a large part of their value and profit from 
speculative operations i.e. from operations in which they only have a short term speculative 
interest rather than a long term interest. The latter strategy has long term implications for the 
firm and thus for its stakeholders. 
There are many differences generated by these various dimensions. There are also some 
commonalities and, in particular, the following. (1) The boundaries of the various dimensions 
are the results of strategic behaviour by the firm. (2) Conversely, once these strategies are 
implemented and the boundaries are redrawn – by whatever dimension -, future strategies are 
affected by them. Moreover, (3) the new boundaries affect the position of different 
stakeholders: from the owners/shareholders to the managers, to the workforce, to the State to 
suppliers, to customers to rival firms. We note that the dimensionality issue acquires 
particular relevance in the context of an analysis based on a variety of stakeholders such as 
labour, governments and suppliers because they may be particularly affected by the various 
dimensional strategies.. When one or two stakeholders only are considered - shareholders and 
managers as in much literature on companies - the dimensionality issue is relatively less 
relevant. 
In the next two sections we shall concentrate on discussions about the two most relevant 
dimensions of boundaries: (a) internalization v externalization v hybrid forms; and (b) the 
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transnationality dimension. Before we embark on that discussion we should, however, 
consider the motivations behind the drawing and changing of boundaries whatever their 
dimension. The traditional, orthodox theory of the firm assumes that the motivation behind 
the firm is profit maximization. If the market conditions in which our firm operates are 
competitive and the firm has little or no control over the price of its products, then this 
means, in effect, efficiency-driven cost minimization. In the real world the situation is 
complicated by the existence of imperfections in the markets for our firm’s final outputs 
and/or its inputs. Moreover, the horizon over which profits are to be maximized is not clear-
cut leading to unclear outcomes as regards the firm’s behaviour. Behaviour that may lead to 
losses in the next year, may lead to profits if the horizon is five years and viceversa.   
A different approach is to take the view that, in the context of market imperfection and 
uncertainty the firm and its managers act strategically rather than – or not just under the 
motivation of - search for efficiency. Strategic behaviour is considered as part and parcel of 
firms’ behaviour within business schools. It is also taken into account by economists 
operating under assumption of oligopolistic behaviour. The strategies given most attention to 
are usually the ones towards rival firms. What is given less attention is the strategic behaviour 
towards other players in the economic system: from labour to governments to suppliers. 
These are the players of interest in this paper. They are stakeholders in the destiny and thus in 
the strategies of the firm. 
2. Boundaries and the organization of production 
As mentioned above the issue of externalization versus internalization is seen by many 
authors as being the issue on boundaries of the firm. Though not seen as the only dimension 
of boundaries (Table 1c) it is here considered as a most relevant one for the firm and its 
various stakeholders.  
There is now a vast literature on internalization v externalization. Most of it goes back to 
Coase (1937) seminal work. Why do firm internalize rather than acquire through the market? 
Indeed were the markets to be as perfect as neoclassical theory has given them credit for, 
there should be no firms: all business activities would be carried out through market 
transactions. The answer to why business activities tend to be internalized and why, indeed, 
firms exist was found in the existence of transaction costs for market operations: costs that 
are low and negligible when operating internally to a firm/ institution.  
This view pits hierarchy versus market as two extreme forms of business governance. 
However, there have always been intermediate forms such as the put-out system of 
production; cooperatives organizing business and firms linking with other firms in a variety 
of ways5. These intermediate forms of organization of production have been mushrooming 
since the 1980s both in terms of typology of forms and in terms of number and values of 
activities they are responsible for. De Man (2004: 159) writes on this: ‘ Just as the divisional 
form was the organization form of the industrial economy, networks are the organization 
form of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries’ economy.’ The mushrooming has 
also – predictably – extended to the literature on such hybrid forms (Jolink and Niesten, 
2012). Economists, sociologists and business strategies have all contributed and continue to 
do so.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Casson	  and	  Cox	  (1997)	  point	  out	  that	  in	  the	  19th	  century	  international	  business	  networks	  originating	  with	  
British	  businesses	  were	  quite	  common.	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A major early contribution is due to Oliver Williamson (1979) who considers ‘intermediate 
forms of organization’ (p. 234). He identifies the overall objective in choosing between 
different organizations of business transactions when he writes: ‘The criterion for organizing 
commercial transactions is assumed to be the strictly instrumental one of cost economizing. 
Essentially this takes two parts: economizing on production expense and economizing on 
transaction costs. …the object is to economize on the sum of production and transaction 
costs.’ (p. 245; italics in original). The aim of his study is to identify the critical dimension 
with respect to which transactions differ. He identifies the principal dimensions as: 
‘uncertainty, frequency of exchange , and the degree to which investments are transaction-
specific…’ (p.261).     
Grandori and Soda (1995) give us the term of ‘inter-firm networks’ for these hybrid forms. 
‘An inter-firm network is a mode of regulating interdependence between forms which is 
different from the aggregation of these units within a single firm and from coordination 
through market signals…’ (p. 184-5). They highlight how different studies have concentrated 
on a variety of elements and variables observed in the networks: from the differentiation of 
the units to be coordinated to the complementarity of their resources; to the intensity of inter-
firm interdependence; to the number of units to be coordinated; to the complexity of 
interdependent activities; to the asymmetry of resources controlled by the various firms in the 
networks. The latter issue – symmetry v asymmetry – is a particularly relevant one. It ranges 
from fully symmetric relationships such as cooperatives or trade associations or industrial 
districts to asymmetric ones: putting-out system; licensing and franchising contracts or 
subcontracting in which there is a principal and one or more sub-contractors with well 
defined and differing degrees of control over resources and over contracts. Many of these 
contracts do not usually involve investment by the principal. In other network forms assets 
are invested by the parties such as in: joint ventures or capital ventures. 
The excellent survey and analysis by Menard (2004) starts with a review of the large 
terminology used in relation to hybrid forms of business organizations. They include: ‘… 
clusters, networks, symbiotic arrangements, supply-chain systems, administered channels, 
nonstandard contracts,…’ ( p. 347). Indeed he quotes Oliver and Ebers (1998: 550) as 
remarking on the ‘ of heterogeneous concepts, theories and research results’.  Menard 
reviews the ‘more extensively documented forms’ of business organization. They range from: 
• Subcontracting. The relationship is particularly common in the building industry as 
documented by Eccles (1981). The contractual relationship may be of long duration 
though each individual contract may have a short duration. 
• Networks of firms linked in supply or distribution chains 
• Franchising with asymmetrical relationship between principal and franchisee 
• Collective trademarks 
• Partnerships 
• Cooperatives 
• Alliances 
What is the position of different participant firms in the network? De Man (2004: ch 3, 39-
56) considers three position for firms in a network; as: (a) group member; (b) bridge; and (c) 
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orchestrator of the network. Position (a) leads to symmetry of power and control for all 
members. These include most cases of collective trademarks and cooperative as well as many 
partnerships. A firm may be a ‘bridge’ linking several networks with the firms in each 
network having no contacts or interests in those belonging to a different network. The 
position of the bridge is, again, asymmetrical with respect to the other firm. The orchestrator 
firm is the one that finds itself in the position of most power with respect to other firms in the 
network. ‘An orchestrator is a central player in the network, for example because of its 
market power (Microsoft), brand name (Nike) or position in the supply chain (Toyota).’ (p. 
44). Because of these reasons and also because the amount of assets invested in the network 
may differ, the power position of different firms within the network may not be symmetrical. 
This echoes our remarks in section two, first subsection, regarding strategic control by large 
firms of their suppliers/distributors. 
Menard concludes his analysis by stating that: ‘…hybrid organizations represent a challenge 
to competition policies built on the simplistic trade-off between firms and markets.’ (p. 370; 
italics in original). I would like to add that they represent also a challenge for: (a) the theory 
of the firm; and (b) the strategies of labour and trade unions.    
3. Cross-countries boundaries: the transnational corporation 
The boundaries of the firm can also be identified in terms of geography of direct operations 
(Table 1c). Firms can have all their activities within the same location or they may disperse 
them. The dispersion may involve a single country or more than one. The dispersion can be 
horizontal or vertical. In the latter case the dispersion of activities pertains to different stages 
of the production process and of the value chain. When direct production activities involve 
two or more countries we have the transnational corporation.  
 Theoretical approaches to the TNC 
As the organizational boundaries needed explanation so do the geographical – by nation state 
– boundaries. Why do firms invest abroad? The answer is not so straightforward since firms 
could, after all, produce at home and source foreign markets via exports. This is something 
they always did and still do to a large extent. So why invest and produce directly abroad? 
Steven Herbert Hymer a Canadian researcher working at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology was the first to delve into the question. Many researchers since have dealt with 
the same or similar problems and several theories have been developed. They do not all deal 
with the same issues and type of activity. Some are theory of the TNC as a firm; some deal 
with the whole range of its activities. Some deal with both the firm and its activities. The 
most prevalent theories are the following6: 
Dunning’s eclectic theory based on Ownership, Location and Internalization (OLI) 
advantages (Dunning, 1977; 1980). Dunning’s emphasis is on: (i) advantages that firms have 
over rivals and which allow them to take up investment opportunities abroad. These are the O 
advantages which have a basis in Hymer (1960). (ii) Advantages that some locations have 
over others in attracting foreign investment (L advantages). (iii) Advantages of direct 
investment – and thus of internalizing activities - over the use of external arrangements such 
as licensing (I advantages). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  	  All	  the	  theories	  mentioned	  here	  –	  as	  well	  as	  others	  including	  Vernon	  (1966)	  -­‐	  are	  presented	  and	  commented	  
on	  in	  Ietto-­‐Gillies	  (2012).	  See	  also	  Ietto-­‐Gillies	  (2014a	  and	  b)	  and	  commentary	  on	  them	  by	  Cantwell	  (2014).	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The internalization theory (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Teece, 1977; Caves 1982; Hennart 
(1982) focus is on the efficiency of internal activities versus externalization strategies. The 
approach builds on Coase’s transaction costs theory (Coase, 1937) and on Williamson (1975; 
1981). It therefore emphasises the efficiency of internal – within the firm – transaction rather 
than market transaction where search, trust and dealing costs are higher. Regarding TNCs the 
development of activities internally has the added advantage of avoiding the leakage of 
research and innovation results and of keeping proprietary knowledge in-house. 
In the evolutionary theories (Cantwell, 1989; Kogut and Zander, 1993) the emphasis is on: (a) 
the TNC as focus of knowledge, innovation and technology; (b) how its internal organization 
helps to develop networks on which knowledge flows and disseminate from country to 
country; and (c) how it supports agglomeration and localities.  
A theory that has been very successful with marketing and strategist academics is that put 
forward by the Scandinavian School (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; Johanson and 
Vahlne, 1977; 1990). This approach focuses on the modalities and stages of the 
internationalization process from the development of activities via through export with the 
aid of independent representatives; to the establishment of sales subsidiaries to the setting up 
of production subsidiaries via FDI. 
A theory which has gained great relevance in economics departments is the New Trade 
Theory applied to TNCs (See Helpman, 1984; Markusen, 1984 and 1995; Krugman and 
Venables, 1996; Venables, 1998; Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004. The conceptual basis 
for this approach is the internalization theory – with some additions from Dunning’s OLI 
scheme. The additional contribution of these theorists relates to the analysis of partial 
equilibrium mathematical models along the lines of new trade theories and imperfect 
competition.  
 Liability of foreigness versus advantages of multinationality 
The study of TNCs and international production takes the point of view of the company as a 
whole, with the shareholders and possibly the managers as sole stakeholders. The traditional 
approach is based on the assumption that there is liability of foreignness (LoF) (Hymer, 1960; 
Zaheer, 1995; Forsgren, 20087),  i.e. that producing abroad is more disadvantageous and 
costly and compared with producing in domestic locations, and that we must therefore look 
for compensating advantages in explaining international production. In the 1960s, at the time 
the pioneer analyses by Hymer and others were developed, it was very reasonable to 
emphasize the disadvantages of producing in foreign countries. But is it now? Currently we 
have a situation in which: (i) International production has been increasing at a very fast pace; 
it is involving more and more countries, more and more companies. (ii) Large TNCs are 
spreading their geographical networks of activities wider and wider. (iii) Moreover, the direct 
international involvement of smaller companies is now considerable and growing.  
 
The following developments have generated very favourable conditions for TNCs and their 
activities leading to the above developments. First, learning and information. The growing 
internationalization has meant that companies have learned more about their international 
environment. They can use the experience of investing abroad in developing strategies for 
future investment in the same country as well as in others. The acquisition of information on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  See	  also	  various	  articles	  in	  the	  Journal	  of	  International	  Management	  (2002).	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the conditions in different countries gives companies added advantages. Already in the 1970s, 
Vernon (1979) considered large TNCs to be ‘global scanners’ capable of scanning the world 
for investment opportunities and locations. Cowling and Sugden (1987) emphasize TNCs’ 
‘detection power’, that is power to obtain, process and use information to their own 
advantage; for example, to get a stronger market position. Thus, TNCs learn to become more 
involved in international production partly through their own experience: because they have 
done it in the past, the process becomes easier. International involvement, in whatever mode 
(exports or direct production or licensing), may lower the cost of further involvement in the 
same or different mode(s) (Petri, 1994). This dynamic process points to the possibility of high 
LoF when a firm first invests abroad and to progressive lower costs as the firm’s foreign 
position becomes established8. 
 
Second, the political context. The neo-liberal ideology and related policies of the last few 
decades have strongly encouraged the activities of transnational companies. The 1960s and 
1970s were decades of confrontation between TNCs and many national governments. At the 
academic level the attack against US investment in Europe was led by Servan-Schreiber 
(1968).  There were a number of nationalizations of foreign assets as well threats of it. 
Nationalizations picked in mid 1970s and became non existent after the mid 1980s 
(UNCTAD-PTC, 1993: fig. 1, p. 17). The changes in the political environment led to decades 
of cooperation (Dunning 1993: ch.13). In the last 30 years+, far from threatening 
nationalizations most governments of both developed and developing countries have 
encouraged and supported the inward investment by TNCs. Moreover, they have engaged in 
massive privatization programmes in which assets have often been acquired by foreign 
companies. 
 
Given the developments in international business and the favourable environment to it, it 
seems appropriate to move away from the emphasis on disadvantages of foreign investment 
and start stressing the advantages of transnationalization as such.  However, the stress on the 
advantages of transnationalization does not mean denying that foreign production may 
involve some additional costs; it just means that conditions are ripe for emphasizing the 
advantages of operating abroad and of spreading activities in host countries.  
 
5. Nation-states generate advantages for TNCs 
 
The advantages of transnationality can thus be classified. 
  
(a) In relation to a variety of stakeholders and in particular: 
• Labour  
• Governments 
• Suppliers and distributors 
• Rival firms 
 
(b) Independently of specific stakeholders 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Giovanni	  Balcet	  has	  pointed	  out	  to	  me	  that	  this	  applies	  also	  to	  FDI	  from	  a	  whole	  country.	  Japanese	  abroad	  in	  
the	  1970	  were	  less	  welcome	  than	  they	  are	  now	  by	  host	  countries	  nationals.	  The	  same	  may	  be	  true	  for	  current	  
Chinese	  FDI.	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• Acquisition of knowledge and innovation 
• Risk spreading 
 
The following points are relevant in the acquisition of all these advantages. First, strategic 
behaviour is essential for companies to realize advantages. Second, the role of the nation-
state is key to the development of strategies by TNCs. To understand the latter point we must 
look at key aspects of the nation-state. 
 
The nation-state and regulatory regimes 
 
The nation-state can be a very significant player in the establishment of firm’s advantages in 
the transnational context.  In order to understand how this comes about let us start with an 
analysis of the following three dimensions of operating across national frontiers.  
 
1. Spatial/geographical dimension. The distance between locations in different nation-
states is often greater than the distance between locations within the same nation-
state. But this is not always the case. For example, the distance between Milan and 
Reggio Calabria is greater than the one between Milan and Geneva. Similarly, the 
spatial distance between Boston and Montreal is less than the one between Boston and 
Los Angeles. 
 
2. Cultural and linguistic dimension. The cultural distance – including business culture - 
is usually greater between nation-states than between regions of the same nation-state. 
But again, this is not always the case. The cultural distance between Milan and 
Geneva is not necessarily higher than the one between Milan and Reggio Calabria. 
 
3. Regulatory regimes dimension. By regulatory regime I mean the sets of all laws, 
regulations and customs governing the economic, social and political life of a country. 
It therefore includes the sets of institutions and regulations governing production, 
markets and the movement of resources across countries. Each country has a specific 
regulatory regime and thus a specific set of rules and regulations which often have 
historical as well as institutional origins and connotations. Countries differ – 
sometimes substantially – in terms of their specific regulatory regime. However, the 
regulatory regime tends to be fairly – though not completely – homogeneous and 
consistent within each nation-state.  
 
Business across national frontiers may involve additional costs compared to business within 
the boundaries of the nation-state.  The costs are associated mainly with the first two 
dimensions: spatial and cultural dimensions. The third dimension may also involve extra 
costs because, for the TNCs, the mastering of – and managing in the context of – different 
laws, regulations and customs by their managers, may also be costly. 
However, the third dimension can also be the source of considerable advantages for 
firms operating transnationally. To understand why this is so, we shall delve further into it. In 
the context of the third dimension, the nation-state is here seen as the locus of a set of 
regulatory regimes, that is, of a set of specific, rules and regulations which apply to people, 
firms and institutions within the borders of the nation-state. Some of these rules and 
regulations stem from the legal or institutional system, some from government policies. Most 
of the following elements embrace several or all aspects of both institutional and policy 
frameworks. 
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Elements of nation-states’ regulatory regimes 
• Rules and regulations regarding the social security system and in particular 
different regimes regarding labour and its organisation 
• Fiscal regimes 
• Currency regimes 
• Regimes of industrial policy 
• Rules and regulations regarding environmental and safety standards 
 
The existence of differences in regulatory regimes across nation-states allows companies that 
can truly plan, organize and control across frontiers to develop strategies to take advantage of 
such differences. This is particularly the case when the strategies aim to enhance power vis-à-
vis actors who cannot – or not yet – plan and organize across national frontiers, or not to the 
same extent as TNCs. Transnationality generates asymmetry of power between TNCs and 
other players. Moreover, companies can enhance the asymmetry through their strategic 
behaviour. 
There is a good amount of literature of firm’s market power and therefore on power 
towards rival companies. However, power may also relate to other players in the economic 
system and specifically labour, governments, suppliers/distributors, subcontractors. Power 
towards these other players can be turned into market power towards rival firms because it 
gives companies opportunities for higher profitability. 
Power can be used to shift the distribution of resources, surpluses, markets. In the case of 
power towards rivals – one of Hymer’s (1960) key points - the distribution relates to market 
shares; in the case of conflicts with labour, the power can be used to change the distribution 
between profits and wages; in the case of power towards governments the issue is distribution 
over the overall surplus and how much should go to the private sphere - companies - or the 
public sphere - governments and taxpayers.  
Thus the first set of advantages (a) listed at the beginning of this section involve 
distributional issues and conflicts with labour, governments, suppliers or rival firms. The last 
two advantages - acquisition of knowledge and risk spreading - (b) - can put the TNC in a 
better position towards rivals and therefore involve distribution over market shares.  We here 
briefly touch on advantages towards suppliers; towards the acquisition of knowledge and 
towards risk. The advantages towards labour and towards government will be given more 
space and attention in the following sections. 
   
Advantages towards suppliers 
 
Operations across different nation-states can enhance the bargaining power of companies 
towards their suppliers and, as a consequence, enhance its competitive power towards rivals. 
The existence of multiple sourcing channels (whether actual or potential) in the various 
countries gives the TNCs a powerful bargaining position towards suppliers. This is 
particularly the case because many suppliers have specific characteristics which make them 
liable to low bargaining power with large TNCs. In particular:  
• suppliers are often smaller companies9 operating in a more competitive environment 
than their customer;  
• they are often located in developing countries;  
• they cannot easily develop alternative international networks.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Some	  suppliers	  can,	  however,	  be	  large	  firms	  as	  is	  the	  case	  in	  the	  automotive	  industry.	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In this situation it is not difficult to see how a big TNC with a large transnational network and 
which can rely on several actual or potential suppliers may use its international position to 
enhance its bargaining power towards specific suppliers. 
 
Knowledge acquisition  
 
TNCs are the big players in innovation and technology and their activities aid the diffusion of 
knowledge and innovation. This process is enhanced because TNCs operate within a double 
network (Hedlund, 1986; Hedlund and Rolander, 1990; Forsgren, Holm and Johanson, 2005): 
 
• The internal network of their units spread across the world; and 
• The external networks that each unit of the TNC has in the country in which it is 
located: networks with customers; suppliers; distributors and local universities and 
research centres. 
 
The external network favours exchange of knowledge between the TNC’s unit and the local 
context with flow of knowledge in both directions. The internal network facilitates diffusion 
of knowledge internally to the TNC and across countries.  
 
It is an approach in which geographical diversification of production enables each unit of the 
TNC to learn from the environment. The acquired knowledge is then transferred to other 
units of the company via the internal network of subsidiaries. In this perspective, 
transnationality generates benefits from operating in a diverse environment with diverse 
knowledge and innovation histories: different nation-states with different cultural 
environments in terms of knowledge, innovation and technology.  Moreover, Cantwell (1989) 
points out how there are two-way spillover effects: from the locality to the company and from 
the company to the locality.  
 
For knowledge diffusion to take place the mobility of labour and of products across countries 
is important. They are vehicles for such diffusion. The extent to which transfer of knowledge 
and innovation takes place partly depends on: (i) The internal organization of the company 
(how free is the unit to liaise with the local business and research environment?); (ii) The 
degree of embeddedness of the unit into the locality; and (iii) The absorption capacity (AC) 
of the receiver be it individual, firm, industry or country. 
 
Advantages towards risk spreading.  
 
A further advantage of operating across several nation-states is connected with risk 
spreading. A strategy of dispersion of production and multiple sourcing can also be a 
diversification strategy which allows the spread of risks of disruptions to production due, for 
example, to political upheavals or industrial disputes in any one country. Disruptions to 
production can come about also through other problems such as natural disasters. Most risks 
linked to the latter are not nation-specific but are more likely to be specific to the physical 
and geographical environment. However, the ability of countries to cope with them and to 
minimize risks and costs for business is, to a large extent, nation-specific and thus specific to 
the social, economic and governance environment and not just to the physical environment. 
Thus a strategy of fragmentation by nation-states may become also a strategy of geographical 
diversification in order to spread risks deriving from the social and political as well as the 
physical environment.  
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6. Labour as stakeholder in the boundaries of the firm 
 
Let us now go back to Table 1 section c: different stakeholders in the boundaries of the firm. 
The most striking feature in reading works on the organization of business transactions – be 
they by hierarchical structures or coordinated via the market or via hybrid forms – is the fact 
that the perspective is always the efficiency and effectiveness of the individual firm in 
relation to the interests of shareholders and managers. De Man (2004) sees the advantages for 
firms and the wider economy in terms of more productive use of resources linked to 
specialization between the various partners in the network. The point of view of other 
stakeholders such as labour and governments hardly comes in. Labour in particular, seems to 
be the forgotten stakeholder in these studies10.  De Man (2004: pp.164-66) does devote one 
section (The individual in the Network) to labour. However, the discourse is entirely in terms 
of the need for the workforce to upgrade its knowledge and to be flexible to meet the 
demands of the firm as well as the network. The point of view is again the firm not the 
employee; for the latter, only duties are considered; no mention of problems and of changing 
contractual position. Yet the position of labour is greatly affected by the various dimension 
and particularly by the organizational and the geographical (by nation-states) dimensions 
discussed in sections three to five. Moreover, labour and its bargaining power may be key in 
the development of firms’ strategies leading to various dimensions. 
To illustrate this point let us first delve into the question of how we got where we are in terms 
of prevailing governance structures and geography of direct activities. Coase started his 
analysis of governance structures by noting that the firm and internalization appear to be the 
odd one out in need of explanation. In fact, internalization and the growth of firms via 
internal activities was also the premise of Chandler (1962) work. This can be explained by 
the growing concentration of production and firm size alongside an economic theory that saw 
the market as sovereign and competition as the normal and desirable market structure. There 
was a need for a theory that kept the basic premises of the neo-classical theory while trying to 
explain why firms grew bigger and, therefore, why the market was not perfect.  Coase’s 
theory provided the explanation.  
In the first decades after WWII the firm grew internally under the pull of growing economies 
and of favourable macro economic conditions with increasing demand for exports and 
consumption as well as investment. There was also plenty of labour supply due to more 
women entering the labour force and to the immigration policies in developed countries. All 
these conditions further favoured internal growth of firms, via hierarchical structures.  
The next few decades bring higher demands by the employed labour force. Internalization has 
made it easier for labour employed under the same ownership umbrella to organize and feel 
solidarity. The demands of labour grow at a time when investment opportunities start 
declining and when the 1970s energy crisis adds to the problems. In this situation firms start 
looking for solutions that involve a decrease in the power of labour to organize and resist: 
externalization is one such solution. As time goes by, technology comes to the aid of such a 
solution: the information technologies make it easier to exercise control whether the 
production activities take place internally or externally. Moreover, logistics solutions – 
pressing under the externalization drive - are eased by the same technology as well as by the 
diminishing costs of transportation.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  My	  reviews	  are	  largely	  of	  economics	  and	  business	  strategy	  works;	  it	  may	  be	  –	  and	  I	  hope	  it	  is	  the	  case	  –	  that	  
industrial	  relations	  studies	  are	  dealing	  more	  with	  the	  labour	  perspective	  on	  hybrids.	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Move forward to the decades from 1980 onwards. Coase’s internalization theory is now well 
developed and accepted. Yet, the business, economic and social situation has changed. 
Externalization has taken hold and is spreading rapidly – largely thanks to the work of 
Williamson - both in private and public sector institutions. If we stick to the logic of the 
neoclassical theory – now encompassing also Coase’s theory – we have to look for 
fundamental changes in transaction costs between the decades around and after WWII and 
the decades from the 1980s onwards. The dichotomy internalization v externalization has 
always been there: why have we seen the system as a whole move – in time - in two 
completely different directions – internalization first and later externalization?  The purely 
neo-classical theory cannot explain it; or, at least, I have not seen convincing explanations of 
why market transactions costs have changed between the two periods. Why they may have 
been very high in the decades after Coase’s publication and why they may have been very 
low – thus leading to more externalization and market transactions - in the last four decades. I 
should, however, point out that most writers in this tradition rarely indulge in historical 
comparisons; they see their role mainly as analysing static situations. If confronted with such 
historical shifts, their conclusion might be that the shift from internalization to externalization 
is a sign that transaction costs have changed: in other words assume away what needs 
explaining. In this writer’s view the shift needs explaining and, indeed, in explaining it, we 
can through light on wider issues regarding the firm and its stakeholders.  
It is here suggested that the move towards externalization has roots in social and political 
elements as well as in economic ones. It is also suggested that strategic behaviour on the part 
of large firms led to externalization and that such strategic behaviour was largely in relation 
to labour. Faced with increasing bargaining power by labour, companies looked for ways of 
curtailing such power – in most cases with the assent and support of governments - via 
strategies of labour fragmentation. Thus the organization of production is here seen as closely 
related to the role and power of labour. Firms’ strategies are greatly affected by conflicts with 
labour and developed partly as attempts to solve those conflicts. 
 Labour fragmentation strategies  
 
In sections three to five we have analysed the changing boundaries of the firm with respect to 
two dimensions: the organizational dimension (hierarchical v hybrid v market) and the 
geographical (by nation-state) dimension. Both these dimensions have become more relevant 
in the last 35 years. Both involve labour in two respects: because the relationship between the 
firm and labour and their industrial relations record may be one of the determinants of 
strategies leading to specific boundaries; and because the change in boundaries has 
considerable effects on the bargaining position of labour. Labour is therefore a significant 
stakeholders in the boundaries of the firm (Table 1b). 
 
 What strategies are open to companies that want to prevent or make it difficult for 
labour to increase their bargaining power? It will be in the interest of companies to try and 
implement strategies leading to the fragmentation of labour and, in particular, the following: 
• organizational fragmentation through the externalization of some activities within an 
overall strategy of control of production; 
• fragmentation by nation-states through the location of production in various countries 
characterized by different labour, social security and labour organization regimes. 
These two fragmentation strategies are not incompatible and they may indeed be 
implemented together. The first strategy (organizational fragmentation) involves the company 
in the externalization of labour through outsourcing strategies (such as subcontracting or 
franchising arrangements) that allow considerable control of production but without the 
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responsibility for the labour employed for such production. The second strategy involves the 
spread of production in regions, countries, areas not linked by common labour organization 
regimes, i.e. having different trade unions and/or different labour and social security laws and 
regulations. These elements make the organization of labour and its resistance to the demands 
of capital more difficult. The underlying assumptions in this analysis are the following: 
a That labour organization is easier whenever labour works for the same 
‘ownership/management unit’ (the hierarchical form of organization); and, that labour 
organization is more difficult whenever employment is dispersed among many 
smaller units – be they wholly or partially independent firms – or among some large 
and some small units. Externalization involves costs and advantages. The costs are in 
terms of control over quality of products11, possible debasement of the brand and 
problems with delivery dates. The advantages are in terms of: low responsibility for 
labour; lower resistance by labour as labour organization is more difficult and often 
made illegal across different proprietary units; shift of much risk from the principal 
firm to the smaller subcontractors. The risk relates to both the labour force employed 
in the value chain and – in many cases – the equipment employed.  
b That labour organization is easier within a single country than between different 
nation-states. This does not imply that, for labour, full harmonization and 
homogeneity of organization and power exist within each country. Differences can 
arise at the level of regions due to local conditions and institutional structures, or 
between different industries or due to different structural features of production in 
terms of ownership/management arrangements. The main point made here is that, on 
the whole, there are greater difficulties for the actual and potential labour organization 
between countries separated by institutional, political, cultural, legal and 
governmental borders than within each border. We can then define areas of ‘labour 
organization regimes’ as those geographical areas within which – ceteris paribus – 
labour finds it easy to organize itself effectively. They are likely to be defined by the 
geographical boundaries of the nation-state though it is conceivable that they could 
extend only within smaller regions of the same country or that they could theoretically 
extend to various nation-states (such as the European Union – EU) if labour manages 
to organize and mobilize across nation-states. Up to now such organization and 
mobilization has not extended beyond the confines of single nation-states.  It is 
interesting to note how governments of the right and centre within the EU have tended 
to favour unification of markets and the free movement of capital but have resisted the 
harmonization of fiscal, labour and social security regimes. 
  
7. Boundaries: an approach based on labour 
 
So far the discussion on boundaries has placed the firm – as defined in the legal/proprietary 
perspective - centre stage; the firm as represented by its owners and managers. However, as 
discussed above (Table 1b), the firm has other stakeholders and particularly labour. One of 
the major theoretical and policy issues emerging from the analysis in previous sections, is 
what the boundaries of the firm imply for the boundaries of labour’s interests, strategies and 
actions. Currently, whenever the organization of production is non-hierarchical, it is widely 
assumed that the firm has no responsibility for the labour involved in the activities 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  This	  is	  particular	  relevant	  in	  services	  industries	  where	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  product	  cannot	  be	  inspected	  prior	  to	  
acquisition	  and	  delivery.	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bought/contracted out by the firm from outside its proprietary confines. The language of 
internalization versus externalization – widely used - lends itself to the idea of insider versus 
outsider labour. 
No one would deny that labour is a major stakeholder in the firm’s decisions regarding the 
organization of production and transactions. (Lazonick, 2012: 343-4) points out how labour 
as well as the State are major stakeholders – and should be considered as residual claimant – 
in strategic decisions. He considers decisions with regard to innovation and technology; in 
our case the decisions are with regard to the boundaries of the firm whose effects on labour 
are at least as relevant as those related to innovation strategies.  
There are two major challenges in taking the perspective of labour as stakeholder in the 
boundaries of the firm. The first challenge (A) is a theoretical one: how can we argue the case 
at the theoretical level. How would a theory of the boundaries of the firm be constructed? The 
second challenge (B) arises at the strategy and policy level: what would be the strategies and 
policies of trade unions arguing the case for labour. Any progress on (A) would strengthen 
the case for (B). Viceversa, case studies and practical problems on the field would help 
develop and refine the theoretical side.   
Table 2 helps to clarify the theoretical side. It lists a variety of organizational forms of 
production against a variety of characteristics. Between the two Coasian organizational 
extreme forms of hierarchy versus market (Table 2, col. 1, rows 2 and 3), there are a variety 
of other possibilities listed in Col one under: franchising; subcontracting; external distribution 
chains; and alliances. Columns two and three consider control by the principal firm over 
production and its process as well as over the firm’s brand. Column four considers whether 
the power relationship between various partners in the contractual form is symmetric or 
asymmetric. Column five highlights whether the principal firm has responsibility for all the 
labour employed in the value chain. Column six attempts an assessment on the impact of 
organizational forms on labour’s bargaining power and in relation to the whole labour 
employed in the value chain.  
The strategies of the firm with regard to its boundaries seem to allocate to labour, boundaries 
that are more limited than the firm’s boundaries of strategic control. Specifically, for 
example, in the case of contracts with suppliers or distributors, the responsibility for labour is 
within each firm separately, be they principal or contractor: labour’s boundaries of actions 
and organization are confined within the principal firm and each subcontractor separately.  
Currently, the principal company is able to exercise strategic control across a variety of firms, 
sectors and countries while having responsibility only for the labour directly employed by it. 
Yet larger number of workers – in various countries – may be contributing to the product 
which ultimately belongs to it – the principal firm – and is sold under its brand. The question 
is: should that be so, given that labour is greatly affected by the changing boundaries of the 
firm? There has been a tacit assumption that labour organization and power cannot and 
should not be all encompassing. This assumption has a basis in law but there is also a 
theoretical economics basis in it: the boundaries of the firm have been seen only from the 
perspective of the shareholders and managers. Is there a way of thinking in terms of a 
different viewpoint on the boundaries of the firm? Of a labour’s point of view on boundaries?  
If we take the purely legalistic perspective – in terms of labour law), the firm has no 
responsibility for labour in these forms and this makes the workforce operating along the 
value chain very weak. However, it can be noted that, unlike in the case of arm’s length 
transactions, the principal firm has a considerable degree of control over production, its 
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process and its brand along the value chain. It could therefore, be argued that, on the basis of 
control, the boundaries of the firm are wider than those of the principal firm and that such 
wider boundaries should also apply to the boundaries of its responsibility, including 
responsibility for labour employed throughout the value chain..  
Table 2. Organizational forms by specific characteristic and impact on labour 
Organizational 
Form 
 
 
1 
Control 
over 
production 
and its 
process 
 
2 
Control 
over brand 
 
 
3 
Power 
towards 
partners in 
value chain 
 
4 
Responsibility 
for labour 
within value 
chain 
 
5 
Bargaining 
power of 
labour 
employed in 
the value 
chain*	  
6 
Hierarchical Full Full N.A. Full Very high 
Arm’s length, 
market 
No N.A. No No Low 
Franchising Yes Yes Asymmetric No Low 
Subcontracting Yes Yes Asymmetric No Low 
External 
distribution 
chains 
Yes Yes Asymmetric No Low 
Alliances/JVs No Yes Sym/Asy 
depending 
on assets 
involvement 
No ? 
*In colums 2-5 the perspective is the principal firm. In col. 6 the perspective is that of labour. 
NB. Any of the organizational forms above can be developed at the national or international 
level. Whenever several countries are involved – in whatever form – the negative impact on 
the bargaining power of labour is likely to decrease. 
Might we begin to think that the boundaries of interest and activity of labour should be 
extended to include all activities over which the company has strategic control? The case for 
a positive answer lies in the fact that all strategies regarding boundaries and all dimension 
and scope of the firm’s boundaries have serious implications for the position of labour at both 
micro and macro levels: in terms of employment, wages, conditions, security and related 
social issues. An alternative view would see the boundaries of interest and activity as 
encompassing  labour working for both the principal firm and the myriad of sub-contractors 
or franchisees or distributors. The boundaries of labour’s interest, strategies and actions could 
also be seen to cross over the nation-state and become transnational whenever the company 
has activities in several countries directly or via its suppliers. The boundaries of labour 
interest, strategies and action could also be seen to span over more than a single sector, 
whenever the firm becomes diversified.  
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This is indeed the argument – though not necessarily the language – used in a recent case 
involving a service industry, one of the sectors in which hybrid forms of organization are 
used extensively and in which the labour force has systematically lost power over recent 
decades. I refer to the recent (May 15th, 2014) protest by fast food workers over wages and 
conditions. The Observer (2014) reports on the on going dispute between workers employed 
in franchises and the fast food companies such as McDonald’s. It quotes one low paid 
franchisee employee as saying: “McDonald’s says it’s not a boss, but it certainly acts like 
one. Setting rules and controlling just about every aspect of its stores, so that the only thing 
that franchisees can skimp on is wages…”. The National Labour Relations Board (NLRB) is 
reported as arguing that ‘the company has too much say not to be counted as a ‘joint 
employers’” The workers rejected the claim that each franchisee is an independent employer 
and they all came together to protest independently of the organizational fragmentation. 
Moreover, the action was coordinated in some 150 cities across the world: thus geography 
(by nation states) and organizational boundaries were overcome.  
This seems like the beginning of something with great potential for further development in a 
variety of industries. The theoretical analysis developed in this section fits in well with this 
real case in industrial relations. The fast food workers are saying to firms and to economics 
and business studies academics: we have a strong stake in the firms we work for; we do not 
accept the boundaries set by the legal/proprietary approach to the firm; we see the boundaries 
as set by the strategic control view.  
8. Boundaries and governments 
Let us now turn to another major stakeholder in the strategies and destiny of the firm and its 
boundaries. There are various ways in which the State and its government are involved and 
interested in the boundaries. For a start, in most countries the State is currently the largest 
employer and a very big funder - and often direct provider - of services. Three points can be 
highlighted with respect to this. The first point relates to hybrid governance structures. The 
state as well as private firms is involved in a variety of production activities – usually of 
services – and has choices regarding the organizational forms for supplying and delivering 
them: from full internalization within State enterprises to full arm’s length acquisition on the 
market, to hybrid forms. The latter have become more and more common in the last thirty 
years, thus mirroring what has been happening in the private sector. So, many of the points 
made above for hybrid form used within the private sector apply equally well to the public 
sector. Specifically the need to: (a) consider the point of view of labour; (b) look at strategic 
control in order to make the case for joint employment responsibility along the value chain; 
and (c) further develop the theory side of the impact of boundaries change on wider 
stakeholders and particularly on labour. 
The second point of involvement by the State is via policies and legislation. Specifically, two 
types of legislation. (a) Regarding labour and industrial relations and the possible rights of 
labour to be involved across the network in hybrid forms. (b) Competition policy. Menard 
(2004: 370) points out that competition policy has been developed with the internalization v 
externalization as either or categories. However, hybrid forms challenge this scheme and so 
create a need to see competition policy in the light of these diverse categories and what they 
involve for the market power of firms. 
A third point derives from the increasing cross-country boundaries of the firm. In Section five 
we considered companies’ advantages of cross country direct operations, i.e. of being a 
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transnational corporation. We specifically concentrated on advantages deriving from the 
existence of different regulatory regimes across nation-states. Here we consider such 
advantages in relation to governments.   
TNCs’ advantages towards governments 
 
Having production locations and business activities in several nation-states can give the 
company a strong bargaining position towards governments of the nation-states and their 
regions. Transnational companies can – and do – play governments of different countries or 
regions against each other with the objective of raising the offer of incentives for the location 
of inward FDI via so-called ‘attractivity policies’ (Oman, 2000; Phelps and Raines, 2002). 
For example, the lack of fiscal harmonization within the EU has led to competition by 
governments for attracting foreign companies – sometimes only nominally rather than with 
jobs and capital relocation – via lower and lower rates of corporation tax.  Moreover, if a 
company has production facilities in many countries its threat of relocation (Kogut,1983) 
becomes very credible and can be used as bargaining power with governments to gain high 
incentives12.  
 
There are further advantages to be gained by a company with direct business activities in 
different nation-states. The latter, as loci of different governance systems and regulatory 
regimes are also loci of specific taxation and currency regimes. Operating across several 
fiscal regimes puts the company in a position to minimize its world-wide tax liability via the 
manipulation of transfer prices, i.e. prices charged for the exchange of goods and services 
within the firm but across national frontiers13.   The manipulation of transfer prices can also 
be connected to operations across different currency regimes with a view to bypassing 
currency controls. This is not a new phenomenon14 . The realization of these advantages by 
TNCs leads to a shift in the distribution of the economic surplus away from the public and 
towards the private sphere.  
Different regulatory regimes regarding environmental and safety standards between different 
nation-states may also lead to advantages for TNCs and to a stronger position in their 
negotiations over the location of FDI. The Guardian (2010) reports that Transocean - the 
owner of the rig leased by BP in Gulf of Mexico disastrous oil exploration - was registered in 
The Marshall Islands. To what extent did this affect its environmental and safety standards? 
 
This type of analysis has also implications for how we look at independence movements 
springing up across the globe and particularly in Europe. Separatist movements are now 
developed and active in many European countries from Britain to Italy to Spain. I have 
argued that the existence of nation-states with their different regulatory regimes generates 
advantages for companies that are truly multi and transnational. If nation-states are 
fragmented into smaller political units with their specific regulatory regimes, this creates 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  In 2011 companies drilling for oil in the North Sea were threatening to relocate in response to the British 
(Coalition) Government introduction of a windfall tax on oil profits. 
	  
13	  On	  transfer	  prices	  see	  Eden	  (2001)	  and	  Ietto-­‐Gillies	  (2012:	  226-­‐9).	  	  
14	  Cox (2000) discusses how the British American Tobacco (BAT) company in the 1930s was able to 
circumvent currency control via the manipulation of transfer prices for their intra-firm transfers.	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further opportunities for exploiting differences by TNCs. Who is going to have advantages 
from the separatist movements that we see across Europe: Lega North in Italy; Basque 
countries in Spain; Scotland in the UK? Cui bono? In whose interest?  
 
Academics and business experts are not averse to arguing for separate units. Ohmae (1995) 
strongly argues for the formation of strong regions free to bargain with TNCs directly without 
having to go via the institutions of the nation-state of which they are part. He advocates the 
formation of region-states oriented towards the global economy rather than the national 
economy. He writes:  
‘Region states…are economic not political units, and they are anything but local in 
focus. They may lie within the border of an established nation state, but they are such 
powerful engine of development because their primary orientation is toward – and 
their primary linkage is with – the global economy. They are, in fact, among the most 
reliable ports of entry.’  (pp. 88-9) 
According to my analysis the region-states advocated by Ohmae would lead to competition 
between different regions of the same nation-state for the attraction of inward investment. 
This is a situation which favours the TNCs in their bargaining for special concessions. 
Reliable ports of entry yes, but for whom and in whose interest? If, within each country, there 
is competition at the regional level for the attraction of inward FDI, the losers are likely to be 
the citizens and the gainers the TNCs. Similarly, regarding competition between nation-states 
via the offer of low tax rates, free land usage and the wider range of attractivity policies in 
general.  
While the companies are happy to overplay the role of sweeteners in their location decisions 
in order to gain as much as possible from the local/national government, in most cases the 
decision by TNCs to invest in a particular location is taken on the basis of different 
considerations such as: labour skills; market access; infrastructures; innovation context. In 
relation to the latter, Mazzucato (2013: 8) comments on the location decisions of Pfizer the 
pharmaceutical company:  
‘Did Pfizer recently leave Sandwich, Kent (UK) to go to Boston in the US due to the 
latter’s lower tax and lower regulation? Or was it due to the fact that the public sector 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) have been spending close to $30.9 billion per year 
in the USA funding the knowledge base on which private pharmaceutical firms 
thrive?’ 
Stopford and Strange with Henley (1991) saw the struggle for world market shares intensify 
the competition not only between firms but also between governments of nation-states and 
regions. They ask themselves: ‘…how has the intensified competition between states and 
between firms for world market shares affected the balance of bargaining power between 
states as a group and multinationals as a group? Their conclusion is: ‘that governments as a 
group have indeed lost bargaining power to the multinationals as the possibilities for 
collective action have diminished.’ The analysis in this paper lead to loss of bargaining power 
by nation-states vis-à-vis TNCs individually and collectively because of divergence in 
regulatory regimes by different nation-states. The authors just cited arrive at the same 
conclusion with regard TNCs as a group on the basis of lack of global regulatory institutions. 
This conclusion is made more poignantly in Strange (1996), a book that sees power moving 
away from states and democratic institutions towards ‘markets and thus to non-state 
authorities deriving power from their market shares’ (189). But…’none of the non-state 
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authorities to whom authority has shifted, is democratically governed. Firms – the new 
players in transnational economic diplomacy – are hierarchies, not democracies.’(197). Thus 
the shift in bargaining power between the corporate sector – particularly the TNCs – has not 
only economic and social but also political effects in that it results in lower levels of 
accountability on the holders of power and in loss of democratic control.  
9. Summary and conclusions 
The paper starts with an analysis of the firm’s boundaries in terms of a variety of issues 
highlighted in Table 1 (a, b and c). Perspectives – legal/proprietary; responsibility; control - . 
Stakeholders – shareholders and managers but also others and specifically labour and  
governments. Dimensions – organization of production; geographical/by nation-state; 
sectoral. Specific consideration is given to the organization of production in hierarchical as 
well as in a variety of hybrid forms and to the position of labour in the context of these hybrid 
forms (Sections three,, six and seven). The geographical – by nation-states - dimension is 
given particular relevance leading to a discussion of transnational companies, the advantages 
they derive from operating across borders and the source of such advantages (Sections four, 
five and eight).  
The paper then moves on to a detailed analysis of the position of two stakeholders vis-à-vis 
the changing boundaries of the firm: labour and governments. Regarding labour both the 
organizational and geographical dimension of strategies of fragmentation are analysed. With 
regard to governments the major consideration relates to the geographical dimension and the 
position of governments in relation to transnational companies. 
The conclusion is that the changing boundaries of the firm particularly with respect to 
organizational forms and to the geography of direct foreign operation by TNCs does put 
labour in a weaker position. And so it does with regards to governments. It is suggested that 
labour and its trade unions would benefit from taking a strategic view of the issue and by 
developing strategies based on the perspective of strategic control by companies. The main 
argument here is that, whenever a company exercises managerial strategic control over other 
firms in the value chain, it is appropriate to take the view that the principal firm may have 
responsibility for the whole labour along the value chain. In practice this requires a 
considerable amount of work in defining relevant element of control and in building up cases.  
It is also suggested that, though this paper may be a step in the right direction, there is a need 
for further research for a better understanding of the boundaries of the firm from the point of 
view of two major neglected stakeholders: labour and governments. The existing literature 
considers the boundaries mainly from the point of view of shareholders and managers.  In the 
context of the organizational and geographical (by nation-states) changes that have taken 
place in businesses we should move away from the concept of boundaries linked to property 
rights and towards boundaries linked to areas of effective responsibility and of strategic 
control.  
The enhanced asymmetry of power, derived from strategies leading to new geographical 
and/or organizational boundaries, has distributional implications: in terms of the distribution 
between wages and profits; and the distribution of the economic surplus between the social 
and private sphere as happens when TNCs use their transnational power to minimize their tax 
liability. Our analysis has also strategy and policy implications for other actors. In general 
labour and governments should avoid strategies that generate scope for further fragmentation 
such as collision between trade unions and/or workers in different sectors or countries. There 
should be caution in embracing political moves leading to regional fragmentation of 
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regulatory regimes. Though decentralization of power to the regions may bring some 
benefits, full independence results in stronger bargaining power for TNCs in their dealings 
with local or regional governments. At the level of the EU, harmonization of social security 
and fiscal regimes would strengthen the power of labour and governments as well as leading 
to more stable economy and society within Europe.  
In general, labour and governments should work towards strategies leading to the 
development of what Galbraith (1957) labelled ‘countervailing power’. In our specific case, 
this means development of strategies aiming to reduce the asymmetry of power deriving from 
transnationalism and from organizational fragmentation.  
The analysis of hybrid forms in Section seven is tentative. In effect we still know little of 
these complex forms. We need, in particular, wider research that puts labour at the centre of 
analysis of the firm and its strategies. We need to study further what effects each form has on 
labour in terms of employment, bargaining power and compensation.  We need to find out 
whether the involvement of assets and/or brand, or of strategic control can make a difference 
to a possible labour’ claim that the boundaries of the firm are more extensive. For example 
that the fast food franchises are in effect also the responsibility of the franchiser because the 
brand is involved throughout and because the franchiser or principal firm exercises strategic 
control over the franchisees or subcontractors. These are issues on which we need to acquire 
more knowledge and we need to utilize the expertise of trade unionists and of people working 
at the coal face to understand what goes on and what are the opportunities and limits of 
action. The road ahead is hard but not impossible. 
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